

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SEOUL 06885 01 OF 02 180715Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----078012 180717Z /17

P 180232Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5784

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 6885

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS USLO PEKING

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS, KS, KN, US, CH)
SUBJECT: CONSULTATION WITH ROKG FOREIGN MINISTER ON SECRETARY'S
DISCUSSION OF KOREA ISSUES WITH THE CHINESE

REF: STATE 193729

SUMMARY. SAW FOREIGN MINISTER LATE AFTERNOON AUGUST 17.

HE WAS PLEASED THAT WE WERE CONSULTING WITH ROKG, BUT
REQUESTED TIME TO CONSIDER MATTER. HIS INITIAL REACTION TO THREE
POWER CONFERENCE WAS NEGATIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS REFTTEL, I MET WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER LATE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON (AUGUST 17).
AFTER I HAD CONVERGED EACH OF THE POINTS MADE IN INSTRUCTIONS,
THE FOREIGN MINISTER RESPONDED BY MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS.

A. HE WELCOMED OUR INITIATIVE AND WAS PLEASED THAT WE
WERE CONSULTING ROKG.

B. HE WISHED TO HAVE ADDITIONAL TIME TO CONSIDER OUR
REQUEST FOR ROKG VIEWS ON OTHER JOINT OR PARALLEL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 06885 01 OF 02 180715Z

INITIATIVES. HE NOTED THAT THE FOUR POWER CONFERENCE
HAD BEEN SUGGESTED BEFORE BUT THAT THE THREE POWER
ALTERNATIVE SEEMED TO BE NEW. OFF-HAND, HE FELT THAT
THE THREE POWER CONFERENCE MIGHT PRESENT SOME PROBLEMS,
WHICH HE WISHED TO STUDY AND DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT
PARK. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE THREE POWER IDEA MIGHT
ABSOLVE THE PRC FROM ANY RESPONSIBILITY RE THE DECI-

SIONS OF THAT CONFERENCE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER FELT THAT THE WORLD WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS MIGHT NOT BE INVOLVED IN SUCH AN IMPORTANT MATTER. SECONDLY, HE FELT THAT THE KOREAN PUBLIC REACTION MIGHT BE ADVERSE BECAUSE OF ITS "MEMORY OF THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE AND THE PARIS PEACE TREATY" (I COULD NOT GET MUCH CLARIFICATION FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THIS POINT.) IN THE THIRD PLACE, FOREIGN MINISTER WONDERED WHAT U.S. ROLE IN THREE POWER CONFERENCE WOULD BE. WOULD IT SIT ON SIDE OF ROK? OR TAKE NEUTRAL POSITION?

C. HE FELT THAT THE BASIC OBJECTIVE OF ANY EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE PENINSULA SITUATION SHOULD BE A RECOGNITION OF THE DE FACTO CO-EXISTENCE OF TWO STATES ON THE PENINSULA. AT A MINIMUM, THERE SHOULD BE AN END TO HOSTILE RELATIONS. IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO EXPECT FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS IN THE SHORT RUN, BUT AT LEAST THE HOSTILE PROPAGANDA SHOULD COME TO AN END.

D. HE OBSERVED THAT IT WAS ABOUT TIME FOR THE PRC TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PRESENT POLICIES WERE NOT LEADING TO A PERMANENT SOLUTION AND THAT THEREFORE IT SHOULD FIND NEW APPROACHES EVEN IF THEY HAD TO BE TAKEN OVER THE NORTH KOREA'S OBJECTIONS. IF THE PRC WERE TO CONTINUE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SEOUL 06885 01 OF 02 180715Z

TO FOLLOW NORTH KOREA BLINDLY, THEN IT COULD NOT EXPECT TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD EXPLORE WITH THE PRC WHETHER IT RECOGNIZED THAT THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR SOMETHING NEW AND FOR NORTH KOREA TO CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE.

2. IN THE CONTEXT OF ROK SUGGESTIONS, FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO URGE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND WOULD WISH TO AVOID UN DEBATE AS STERILE AND UNPRODUCTIVE. HE TOLD ME THAT LAST MARCH, DURING A MEETING WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM HE HAD, AS A PERSONAL EXPRESSION, SUGGESTED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE PASSAGE OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD SUPPORT PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM THROUGH NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND SUPPORT THE ENTRANCE OF BOTH KOREAS INTO THE UN. SINCE HE HAD NEVER DISCUSSED THIS IDEA WITH PRESIDENT PARK, HE HAD NOT PURSUED IT WITH WALDHEIM, BUT SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS STILL WORTH CONSIDERING.

3. AFTER OUR EXCHANGE ON U.S. INITIATIVES, THE FOREIGN MINISTER RAISED SOME QUESTIONS OF CONCERN TO HIM:

A. WILL THE SECRETARY RAISE IN PEKING THE QUESTION OF NORTH-SOUTH ENTRY INTO THE UN AND THE QUESTION OF CROSS-RECOGNITION? (I SAID I DIDN'T KNOW.)

B. IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY OF NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATION APPROACHING THE SECRETARY DURING THE PRC VISIT? (I REPEATED OUR POSITION ON DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE PENINSULA.)

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 SEOUL 06885 02 OF 02 180654Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----077761 180656Z /15

P 180232Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5785

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 6885

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS USLO PEKING

C. DID THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO TITO, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS, DISCUSS THE KOREAN QUESTION? (I SAID I DID NOT KNOW THE CONTEXT OF THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER.)

D. WILL UNDER SECRETARY HABIB COME TO SEOUL AFTER PEKING? (MY REPLY WAS THAT I THOUGHT SOMEONE FROM SECRETARY'S PARTY WOULD COME.)

4. COMMENT: IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOT PREPARED TO RESPOND RIGHT AWAY TO OUR INVITATION FOR IDEAS. HE REQUESTED THAT PARTICULARLY THE THREE POWER CONFERENCE IDEA NOT BE PURSUED UNTIL ROKG HAS HAD OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER IT. I URGED THAT HE DO SO AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND THAT HE ALSO GIVE ME ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS THAT MIGHT OCCUR TO ROKG. I FOUND THE ABSENCE OF ANY MENTION OF A NON-AGGRESSION PACT INTERESTING, SINCE MOFA HAS RAISED THAT POSSIBILITY WITH US ON MANY OCCASIONS. THE POSSIBILITY OF ROK ADMITTANCE TO UN WAS RAISED SEVERAL TIMES, GIVING FURTHER INDICATION OF

IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE TO ROKG AT THIS TIME. FINALLY,
I NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER LATCHED ON EAGERLY TO
OBJECTIVE OF CASTING CLEAR FOCUS ON NORTH KOREA'S RESPON-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 06885 02 OF 02 180654Z

SIBILITY IF IT SHOULD RAIL TO RESPOND. THAT SEEMED TO
INTEREST HIM MORE THAN ANY IDEAS FOR EVOLUTION OF
PENINSULA PROBLEM, STEMMING PERHAPS FROM HIS EXPRESSED
SKEPTICISM OF ANY POSITIVE REACTION FROM PRC.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR
RESPONSE, IF ANY, TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN
MINISTER, AS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH THREE.
STERN

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, PEACE, BRIEFINGS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977SEOUL06885
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P850067-2550
Format: TEL
From: SEOUL
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770848/aaaabolv.tel
Line Count: 188
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 35028b58-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 77 STATE 193729
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1560548
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONSULTATION WITH ROKG FOREIGN MINISTER ON SECRETSARY'S DISCUSSION OF KOREA ISSUES WITH THE CHINESE
TAGS: OVIP, KS, KN, US, CH, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (PAK TONG-CHIN)
To: STATE SS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/35028b58-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009